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In December 2003 the British Medical Journal published 
a tongue-in-cheek paper by Smith and Pell [1]. In it, 
they described how parachutes, instruments designed to 
prevent or minimise “major trauma related to gravitational 
challenge”, had not been tested using randomised trials, 
which are the accepted system for testing medical devices. 
Without randomised and placebo controlled testing, 
could be we sure that parachutes were safe?
Automobiles are another example of  where a widely 
accepted technology has slipped under the radar in terms 
of  safety. Given the number of  automobile accidents 
resulting in serious injury or death, the number of  recalls 
of  faulty automobiles announced through the media, the 
amount and type of  pollutants released by automobiles 
into the environment, and the fact that automobile travel 
involves hurling ourselves across the ground on a heavy 
machine designed to create and sustain an explosion, 
why does the public not request a moratorium on further 
automobile production until companies can demonstrate 
the complete and absolute safety of  such a technology?
What makes certain technologies the objects of  intense 
public pressure for regulation and control instead of  
others, and how does regulation play a role in helping or 
hindering the delivery of  a technology to the end-users? 
The answers to these questions are varied and will depend 
on a number of  factors, including how information 
regarding the risks and benefits of  the technology is 
presented, people’s ideological and moral standpoints, 
and the uncertainty surrounding a technology and its 
impact on people’s health, environment and general 
lifestyle. How do you design different regulatory systems 
which ensure an acceptable level of  safety, reflect the 
values of  society and allow those technologies which are 
beneficial to reach people?  There are many examples of  
technologies and regulatory structures being developed in 
ways that illustrate the challenges these questions present. 
The answers to how we can overcome these challenges 
will depend on the transparency of  the process, equitable 
demands and conditions for information regarding safety 
and/or harm, and equal parts cynicism and hope.
Perhaps the clearest example where a technology’s 
development has been impeded by both the regulatory 
system and a lack of  clarity and conflicting societal 
views is that of  genetically modified crops or foods (GM 
foods). In places like the United States or Canada, the 
regulatory system begins with a political decision (in their 
respective cases, the assumption of  no harm) and follows 
with a scientific assessment of  possible harm.  As a brief  
overview, data is gathered regarding safety, efficacy and 
possible environmental impacts, and if  no evidence of  
harm is detected the new foods or crops are allowed 
onto the market [2][3]. In contrast, Europe begins the 
process with a political decision to base its regulatory 
system on the Precautionary Principle whereby if  harm 
is seen as a possibility (even without scientific evidence), 
then approval of  products can be withheld until further 
satisfactory evidence of  their safety is provided. The 
European process also ends with a political decision in 
that, even if  a positive assessment is given by the European 
Food Safety Administration (EFSA), the European 
Commission can vote to withhold approval. The result 
is a system that demands proof  of  a negative (the lack of  
harm – impossible to completely prove), and that rests on 
normative political perceptions [4].
Why is this problematic? Firms trying to produce 
GM products find it challenging because they invest 
a lot of  resources trying to get through the regulatory 
system without any clear indication that they could be 
successful, even if  they provided the evidence requested 
by regulators.  Some firms would actually prefer a 
straight moratorium on GM products in Europe than 
an antagonistic regulatory system as they could then 
turn their resources and attention to other products [5]. 
Furthermore, the political decision to prohibit GM foods 
for cultivation in Europe is not necessarily democratic. 
There are farm and consumer groups that would like 
to have the option to purchase or cultivate GM foods, 
and the debate has been shaped by non-governmental 
organisations and lobby groups that do not necessarily 
represent the majority nor contribute to information on 
the nature of  the technology in a balanced way [6].
The negative perception that GM technology has 
amongst large portions of  the public despite scientific 
evidence to the contrary is worrying for scientists, 
industry and government in terms of  other emerging 
technologies. Nanotechnology, for example, is one such 
technology which is still being defined in terms of  its 
applications, and the associated benefits and risks. A 
range of  potential benefits have been identified, from 
new materials with smart capabilities to nano-robotic 
technologies which could be used in medicine for cancer 
treatment or advanced diagnosis.  The risks speculated 
include environmental damage, terrorist use, and health 
and safety concerns [7][8]. Synthetic biology – the 
ability to build and manipulate biological materials 
from scratch – is another emerging technology which is 
facing the same concerns [9]. The evidence around these 
different scenarios is tenuous at best, but the possibility 
has already prompted calls for early regulation. These 
calls are motivated on the one hand by the desire to 
minimise any potentially harmful effects before they 
emerge, and on the other hand to engage the public early 
on so that the negative perception and caustic opposition 
that arose around GM crops could be avoided. The fact 
that different groups, both in support and opposition 
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of  these technologies, want to see regulation developed 
is understandable given what regulation can do if  
designed in different ways (it can be permissive, it can 
be prophylactic or preventive, it can be used to signal to 
funders what research to support) [7].
What regulation is being asked to address, if  framed in a 
very simple manner, is not simply safety; it is being asked 
to address people’s perception of  risk. It is being asked 
to address the general public’s perception of  risk and 
fears regarding unknown (but possible) negative effects of  
emerging technologies. It is being asked to address the 
fears of  industry in terms of  facilitating their development 
of  new markets, while providing a mechanism that can 
help prevent public backlash against their products. It is 
seen as a mechanism by interest groups to protect their 
own interests in regards to a technology or industry. 
While I propose that regulation is being asked to address 
the perception of  risk and to lower people’s fear of  
uncertainty, what should the regulation of  science and 
technology actually achieve? While opinions may differ as 
to the benefits of  different new technologies and whether 
society is better or worse off, regulation should be seen as 
a mechanism that provides a balance between safety and 
facilitating the delivery of  a technology’s benefits to society. 
This requires transparency of  information regarding the 
possible impacts of  a technology; and in order to achieve 
this it is necessary to have a broadly accepted level of  
scientific grounding and rigour in the research that 
provides it. Transparency of  information also means the 
provision of  information to the general public in a non-
technical manner. The provision of  this information must 
also be seen as extending from a neutral party; part of  
the problem [10] is that industry and government have 
been portrayed as biased (and implicitly or explicitly 
as dishonest) regarding technologies such as GM foods 
and crops. For this reason, all parties engaging in the 
regulatory debate should be welcome to provide their 
evidence, but also expected to adhere to the standards of  
rigour and transparency, namely explaining where their 
evidence came from, how they are funded and who they 
represent. For example, some anti-GM groups are funded 
by organic farming organisations which stand to benefit 
from market share and improved public perception of  
their products if  GM foods are portrayed as unhealthy 
or dangerous. The continued support for basic and 
applied research in universities from public funds would 
go a long way in helping build trust in the science and 
information provided around these technologies; third 
party funding can be seen as separate from industry other 
private agendas (e.g. from NGOs, lobby groups). Finally, 
the structures of  a regulatory system should reflect values 
broadly representing the society it is in, but these should 
only be the starting point of  a regulatory process; the 
process and decisions should then reflect the previously 
accepted scientific and technical processes. Regulatory 
systems which set rules, such as that for Europe’s food 
and agriculture, ask for evidence based on these rules 
and give the impression that approval will be given if  
the conditions are met.  However, this is not always the 
case.  Often the “goalposts” are moved due to political 
pressures, which then leads to wasted resources on all 
sides, and more importantly, a breakdown of  trust – 
the key ingredient of  a sound and beneficial regulatory 
system.
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